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move to suppress the evidence before the trial, nor until one witness had
testified without objection. 'HELD: Conviction affirmed. The court will
not permit an inquiry into a collateral issue as to the source of competent
evidence after the trial has started on its merits. Hantz v. State, App. Ct.
of Ind., May 8, 1929, 166 N. E. 439.
An objection to admissibility of evidence must be timely made. 1 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 16(a). Weight of authority as well as reason
limits the inquiry of competency to proper testimony, and the courts do
not stop to inquire as to the means by which the evidence was obtained.
Adams v. N. Y., 192 U. S. 585, reaffirmed in Cogen v. U. S., 49 Sup. Ct.,
118 decided January 2, 1929.
Practically every state follows the rule laid down in Adams v. N. Y.,
supra, and the one recognized in Hantz v. State, supra. Only Kentucky
holds that evidence obtained by search warrant may be challenged after
the trial has started on its merits.
This case is interesting in that the Supreme Court of Indiana has never
as yet given a decision as to what is a timely petition for return of property
taken under a defective search warrant, or to suppress evidence and the effect of an untimely objection. The Appellate Court, however, since adopting
the rule in Hantz v. State in May, 1929 has followed the rule in the following cases decided by it since that time: Breece v. State, 166 N. E. 620,
Goebel v. State and Arnold v. State, 166 N. E. 446, Boston v. State, 166 N.
E. 448, Eichoff v. State, 166 N. E. 445, Foster v. State, 166 N. E. 447, McSwain v. State, 167 N. E. 568, Thompson v. State and Thinnee v. State,
167 N. E. 345. These cases are reported in 88 Ind. App. -.
The rule laid down seems to assist in the administration of justice, is
clearly the weight of authority, and will likely be adopted by our Supreme
Court if squarely confronted with the question.
T. H. F.
LANDLORD

AND

TENANT-CONTRACTS---BANRUPTCY

AS

ANTICIPATORY

Bn.cH-On Jan. 5, 1927, a contract was entered into between Robert M.
Catts and the Merchants' and Manufacturers' Exchange, parties of the first
part, and Melian Pavia, claimant, party of the second part, whereby the
latter agreed to pay the former $10,600,000 for the sale of certain leasehold premises to be acquired by the former; $125,000 on account of the
purchase price was paid by claimant. On Feb. 3, 1927 Catts and the
Merchants' and Manufacturers' Exchange was adjudicated bankrupts and
trustees were appointed for their estates. On August 2, 1927, Pavia filed
with the referee in bankruptcy proofs of claims against the trustees of the
respective estates, setting forth the above contract, the payment of the
$125,000, the failure of the bankrupts to acquire title to the property and
convey it to claimant, and the election of claimant to rescind the agreement and recover the $125,000 with interest. The referee allowed the claim,
and the matter comes before this court on a petition to review the referee's
order HELD: Order of the referee affirmed. In re Catts. In re Merchants' and Manufacturers'Exchange of New York, Claim of Pavia. Dist.
Ct. S. D., N. Y., June 25, 1929, 33 Fed. (2d) 963.
There being no existing res in the bankrupts' possession when the agreement was made, this was an executory contract which bound them to
acquire the land in the future and transfer it to claimant. Cincinnati, etc.

RECENT CASE NOTES
R. Co. v. McKeen, 64 F. 36; Farringtonv. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679. Where
there has been a renunciation of an executory contract by one party, the
other party has a right to elect between the following remedies: (1) to
rescind the contract and pursue the remedies based upon such rescission;
United Press Ass'n. v. National Newspaper Ass'n., 237 F. 547; (2) To
treat the contract as still binding and wait until the time arrives for its
performance, and at such time to bring an action for breach; New Brunswick, etc. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 12 F. 377; (3) To treat the renunciation as
an immediate breach and sue at once for any damages which he may have
sustained. Weld v. Victory Mfg. Co., 205 F. 770; Golden Cycle Min. Co. v.
Rapson Coal Co., 188 F. 179. The court in this case apparently treats the
claimant's election to rescind as an election to proceed under the last remedy
above named. Disablement from performance of contract is a breach
thereof. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 S. Ct. 780, 44 L. Ed. 953. Bankruptcy is a complete disablement; Re Swift, 112 F. 315; Re Pettingill, 137
F. 143; Re Neff, 157 F. 57; Re Duquesne Light Co., 176 F. 785; and hence
constitutes a material breach of the executory contract. Conway v. White,
292 F. 837; Roehm v. Horst, supra; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorz'm Ass'n., 240 U. S. 581, 36 S. Ct. 412, 60 L. Ed. 811, L. R. A. 1917B
580; In Re Portage Rubber Co., 296 F. 289. The promisee has the option
to treat the contract as ended, so far as further performance is concerned,
and maintain an action at once for the damages occasioned by such anticipatory breach; Roehm v. Horst, supra; O'Neill v. Supreme Council, 70
N. J. L. 410; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, supra; In re Portage Rubber Co., =pra; subject, however, in this case to the right of the
trustees in bankruptcy either to assume or renounce performance of the
contract within a reasonable time, said contract passing by operation of
law as part of the bankrupts' estate to the trustees. Sparhawk V. Yerkes,
142 U. S. 1, 35 L. Ed. 915; Sessions v. Romnaika, 145 U. S. 29, 36 L. Ed.
909; Gazlay v. Williams, 210 U. S. 41, 52 L. Ed. 980, 28 S. Ct. 687. Eighteen
months having elapsed without an assumption of the contract, the trustees
must be held to have renounced any right with respect thereto. Claims,
to be provable, must exist at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, those arising later being neither provable nor discharged. Zavelo
v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625, 33 S. Ct. 365, 57 L. Ed. 676; Moulton v. Coburn,
131 F. 201; Re Roth, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 270, 181 F. 667; Colnan Co. v.
Withoft, 195 F. 250. Hence, to sustain the position that bankruptcy
operates as a breach of contract giving to the solvent party a provable
claim, it must be held that not the adjudication in bankruptcy, but the petition is the breach. For this reason some courts have distinguished between
a voluntary and an involuntary bankruptcy, holding that where involuntary
proceedings are instituted, they do not constitute such a breach as to
authorize proof of damages. In re Inman and Co., 175 F. 312; In re Imperial Brewing Co., 143 F. 579. It is easier to regard a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy as a repudiation than the filing by a creditor of such a petition, it being difficult to see how a debtor's contracts can be repudiated by
his creditor; especially when the petition might not be sustained and followed by an adjudication of bankruptcy. Williston on Contracts, sec.
1327. It has been held, however, that adjudication is an essential element
of the existence of an anticipatory breach of the contract, but that when
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such adjudication is made, the breach must be related back to the time of
the filing of the petition. In re Portage Rubber Co., supra; In re Swift,
supra. Despite the above authorities, the apparent weight of authority is
that involuntary as well as voluntary bankruptcy constitutes an anticipatory
breach giving rise to provable claims on the ground that bankruptcy proceedings, however instituted, are but the natural and legal consequence of
something done or omitted to be done by the bankrupt in violation of his
implied engagement to maintain ability to perform. Central Trust Co. v.
Chicago Auditorium, supra; Penn. Steel Co. v. N. Y. City R. Co., 198 F.
721; Heyward v. Goldsmith, 269 F. 946; Re Swift, 112 F. 315; Re Stern,
116 F. 604; Re Pettingill, supra. It is submitted that the privilege of the
trustees to assume the contract, if they so desire, cannot be reconciled with
the theory that bankruptcy, whether involuntary or voluntary, is a breach
of the contract, since on sound principle the trustees can have no greater
rights than the bankrupt, and if there has been repudiation or material
breach, it seems impossible to deny the solvent party the right to refuse
to proceed with the contract even though the trustee in bankruptcy subsequently desires to adopt it. Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1327.
K. J. M.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACTs

OF AGENT-Plaintiff recovered a judgment on a note and a foreclosure of a
mortgage, and defendant appealed. Defendant executed the note and
mortgage to defendant and delivered them to one E., the agent of the
bank. E had authority to secure and conduct business with foreigners for
the bank. The occasion for the execution of the note and mortgage was
the promise of E to procure a bond which would enable defendant to release his brother who was held by immigration authorities. E had no
authority to do this. E later introduced defendant to the officers of the
plaintiff bank, who promised to advance him the money on good security.
The mortgage and note were executed, and a check was given to E to give
to defendant. E absconded with the money. HELD: judgment reversed.
The agency did not end when defendant was introduced to the officers of
the bank, and E was acting in the course of his employment when he
absconded. Kostoff et ux. v. Meyer-Kiser Bank, Supreme Court of Indiana,
August 13, 1929, 167 N. E. 527.
A bank is liable for acts of the agent when acting in the apparent
scope of his authority even though the acts are fraudulent; and where a
principal authorizes an act by his agent, he is bound by the acts and
representations of the agent while doing that act. Day v. Dages, 17 Ind.
App. 228; First National Bank v. Josefoff, 57 Ind. App. 320; Wolfe v.
Pugh, 101 Ind. 293.
If the agent has ostensible authority to do an act, he is presumed to
have such authority unless the contrary is shown and if it is in the apparent course of his employment. Hawkins v. Fourth National Bank, 150
Ind. 117.
Where a bank holds out even a minor official as being intrusted with
certain powers and duties, his acts within the scope of such apparent
authority are binding on the bank. Fort Worth etc. Bank v. Martin, 8
S. W. 507; Munn v. Burch, 25 Ill. 35; 7 C. J. 559.

